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Abstract
Corporate patents are perceived to be the key profit-drivers in many multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs). Moreover, as the transfer pricing process for royalty
payments is often highly intransparent, they also constitute a major source of
profit shifting opportunities between multinational entities. For both reasons,
MNEs have an incentive to locate their patents at affiliates with a relatively
small corporate tax rate. Our paper empirically tests for this relationship by
exploiting a unique dataset which links information on patent applications to
micro panel data for European MNEs. Our results suggest that the corporate
tax rate (differential to other group members) indeed exerts a negative effect on
the number of patents filed by a subsidiary. The effect is quantitatively large and
robust against controlling for affiliate size. The findings prevail if we addition-
ally account for royalty withholding taxes. Moreover, binding ‘Controlled Foreign
Company’ rules tend to decrease the number of patent applications.
JEL classification: H25, F23, H26, C33
Keywords: corporate taxation, multinational enterprise, profit shifting
∗Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Sa¨ıd Business School, Park End Street, Oxford,
OX1 1 HP, e-mail: tom.karkinsky@sbs.ox.ac.uk
†Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Sa¨ıd Business School, Park End Street, Oxford,
OX1 1 HP, e-mail: nadine.riedel@sbs.ox.ac.uk
We are indebted to the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), especially to Rachel Griffith and Helen Miller,
for providing us access to the dataset used in this paper and for several helpful comments. Moreover, we
thank Wiji Arulampalam, Steven Bond, Mihir Desai, Michael Devereux, Clemens Fuest, Rick Krever
and participants of seminars at the University of Oxford for helpful comments and suggestions.
1
1 Introduction
Anecdotal evidence suggests that multinational companies strategically locate owner-
ship of their intellectual property at tax-havens, with the intention of minimizing their
corporate tax burden. For example, the Wall Street Journal reports that Microsoft,
a company which earns three-fourths of its revenue from license fees, is “increasingly
setting up units in Ireland that route intellectual property and its financial fruits to
the low-tax haven” (Wall Street Journal, 2005). In the UK, the Guardian writes that
“three FTSE 100 companies have quietly transferred their valuable intellectual prop-
erty to low-tax locations”, meaning that “they can reduce their UK-based profits and
hence their British tax bills” (The Guardian, 2009).
The rationale behind locating intellectual property at low-tax affiliates is two-fold.
First, intangible assets are increasingly perceived to be important value-drivers within
multinational enterprises (MNEs) (e.g. see Hall, 2001, Zingales, 2000). Locating them
at low-tax affiliates is thus an attractive tax saving strategy as it implies that the
intangibles’ profits become taxable at a low corporate tax rate. Second, the common
good nature of intellectual property involves that it is used as an input factor by several
operating affiliates within the multinational group which then pay a royalty or license
fee to the intangibles-owner (see e.g. Markusen, 1995). As arm’s length-prices for these
firm-specific royalty payments are commonly not available to tax authorities, MNEs
can distort royalty prices in order to shift profit between the operating entities and the
intangibles-owner. Consequently, it pays for the MNE to locate its intellectual property
at a low-tax country as this establishes a profit shifting link between all operating
affiliates and a tax-haven subsidiary (see also Dischinger and Riedel, 2008).1
Tax authorities have raised increasing concerns about the relocation of intangible
assets to low-tax economies as they fear that the mitigation of intellectual property
deteriorates their country’s corporate tax base (see e.g. Hejazi, 2006). Nevertheless,
studies which go beyond anecdotal evidence and investigate the link between corporate
taxation and the location of intellectual property in a systematic empirical framework
are scarce as information on intellectual property ownership is commonly not available
in standard firm data sets.
In the following, we will investigate this relationship by exploiting a new and unique
1In the contrary, if the intangible asset is located at a high-tax subsidiary, the MNE obtains shifting
possibilities solely between the tax haven and the intangibles-holding firm whereas other high-tax
affiliates remain without shifting link to a low-tax country.
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data source that connects accounting and ownership information for a large panel of
European multinational subsidiaries to data on patent applications provided by the
European Patent Office (EPO). Thus, our analysis focuses on the location of corporate
patents as a particular form of intangible property. The data is available for the years
1995 to 2003. To identify the impact of corporate taxes on multinational patent loca-
tion, we additionally merge information on various aspects of the corporate taxation
system. Following our argumentation above, we account for the host country’s corpo-
rate tax burden (as measured by the statutory corporate tax rate) and the relative
attractiveness of a subsidiary’s corporate taxation scheme compared to other firms in
the multinational group (as measured by the corporate tax rate differential between
the entities). Moreover, our analysis takes into account that the effective tax burden on
royalty income may be affected by withholding taxes on royalty payments and so-called
Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules which are implemented at the subsidiary’s
parent location and attempt to refrain MNEs from avoiding taxes in their residence
country by making passive (patent) income earned at low-tax subsidiaries taxable at
the parent location.
We assess the link between corporate taxation and the number of patent applications
in various empirical specifications. Our most preferred model is a negative binomial
framework which controls for affiliate fixed effects. The results suggest that both, the
corporate tax rate and the tax rate differential to other group affiliates, exert a nega-
tive impact on the subsidiary’s number of patent applications whereas the effects are
robust against the inclusion of time-varying country characteristics and affiliate size
controls. Quantitatively, the coefficient estimates are sizable, implying semi-elasticities
of −2.3 and larger. Thus, the regressions indeed suggest that MNEs distort the location
of patents in favor of affiliates with relatively low corporate tax rates. Moreover, we
find that the negative effect of taxes on the number of patent applications prevails if
we construct tax measures that additionally account for withholding taxes on royalty
income. Last, our regressions indicate that CFC regulations are effective in refrain-
ing MNEs from locating patents at low-tax locations since binding CFC rules tend to
reduce the number of patent applications filed by a corporate subsidiary.
Our study contributes to the literature on multinational income shifting. A growing
number of papers has provided empirical evidence which suggests that MNEs transfer
profits from high-tax to low-tax affiliates in order to diminish their corporate tax burden
(see e.g. Devereux, 2007; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). Recent work has connected these
multinational profit shifting activities to the ownership of intellectual property.2 The
2Several studies suggest a strong general link between intangible property ownership and the emer-
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idea is that arm’s length prices for intra-firm royalties charged for the use of firm-specific
intangible assets are hardly observable to tax authorities and that multinationals can
thus easily distort the associated transfer prices and shift profits to low-tax countries.
This notion is confirmed by a set of empirical papers which show that profit shifting
activities are larger in MNEs with high intellectual property holdings and high R&D
intensities (see e.g. Grubert, 2003).
However, in contrast to our work, these papers neglect that corporate taxation may
distort the location of intangible assets itself as MNEs have an incentive to ensure that
their patent returns are taxable at a low rate and that profit shifting channels to low-
tax countries are available to operating affiliates world wide. In this sense, our analysis
is most closely related to two recent papers: Mutti and Grubert (2008) provide evidence
that US MNEs structure their operation in such a way that royalty income accrues with
foreign subsidiaries in low-tax countries. However, as they do not observe information
on patent ownership or license agreements, their evidence is indirect. Dischinger and
Riedel (2008) find that the corporate tax rate exerts a negative effect on the size
of intangible property assets, as reported on company balance sheets. However, using
balance sheet data has limitations as it does, for example, not allow for a disaggregation
of the legal assets which constitute the reported intangible asset figure whereas our
study focuses on a clearly identified form of intellectual property.
Moreover, our paper is related to a small literature that investigates how the tax
system affects the location of R&D activity within multinational companies. For the
US, Hall (1993) and Hines (1994) study the responsiveness of corporate R&D to the
Research and Experimentation Tax Credit and find significant R&D price elasticities.
Similarly, Jaffe and Hines (2001) determine how US R&D expense deduction rules affect
the location of R&D by US multinationals.3 Bloom et al. (2002) confirm a significantly
positive effect of R&D tax credits on the level of R&D expenditures using macro data
gence of multinational firms as with intellectual property holdings the threat of knowledge dissipation
tends to favor market entry through foreign direct investment over other entry modes like licensing
agreements with third parties (see e.g. Ethier and Markusen, 1996; Saggi 1996, 1999; Fosfuri, 2000;
Markusen, 2001; Gattai and Molteni, 2007).
3The study of Jaffe and Hines (2001) is also related to ours in the sense that they use a data set
which is the US equivalent to our data as it equally combines firm information and data on patent
applications. One important difference though is that Jaffe and Hines (2001) are interested in the
location of R&D rather than in the location of the corporate patents. Thus, they exploit the patent
office data with respect to the information on the location of the patent inventor while we in contrast
use the information on the location of the patent applicant. Note that inventor and applicant location
differ for a substantial fraction of the patents in our data set, being well above 10%.
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for major OECD countries. However, all of the cited papers focus on the role of R&D
tax credits and abstract from potential effects of the corporate tax system on the
location of the legally protected output to R&D activities, i.e. the corporate patents.
Our study fills this gap and assesses the impact of corporate taxation on the choice of
patent location accounting for various tax incentives, including the statutory corporate
tax rate, withholding taxes and CFC legislations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical considerations.
Sections 3 and 4 describe the data set and the estimation methodology. In Section 5,
we show the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
This section explores how the international corporate tax system may affect patent
ownership within multinational firms. The following discussion leads on to Section 3,
where we construct the tax variables used in our empirical analysis.
The value of a patent stems from its provision of a temporary monopolistic right
to exploit the associated technology within a given geographic area. Any party that
wishes to use the technology in that geographic area will have to pay a royalty fee to
the patent owner. To avoid knowledge dissipation, MNEs have a tendency to sell the
right to exploit a patented technology to affiliated companies only (see Introduction)
whereas the latter are forced, by the transfer price system, to pay a royalty to the
patent owner. While in many cases the inventor of the technology is also the owner of
the associated patent, our data suggests that the location of R&D activities and the
resulting patents can also be geographically separated within multinational groups, as
the locations are split in a non-negligible number of cases.4
The MNE’s decision where within the group to locate its corporate patents is ex-
pected to be influenced by a set of tax considerations. First, patents belong to the
value-drivers in multinational firms (see e.g. Hall, 2000, 2007; Hall et al., 2005) and as
their income becomes part of the owner’s corporate tax base, MNEs have an incentive
4According to practitioners a geographical separation of the R&D and patent location is easy to
implement. First, tax authorities can hardly track the link between R&D activities and patent location,
especially if several multinational affiliates participated in the development of a patent. Second, R&D
and patent location can be split by officially assigning the project risk to a different affiliate than the
one hosting the R&D activity. The risk-bearing unit in charge for the project then pays a fixed fee
comprising the development costs and a fixed margin to the R&D department while it receives the
resulting patents and the associated patent returns.
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to locate their patents in a country with a small corporation tax. This incentive is
especially strong as patented knowledge (like other intellectual property) has a trade
price of zero and the location of patents and output production can henceforth be
geographically separated at low costs.5
Second, not only the host country’s corporate tax burden may be decisive for the
location of multinational patents but also the affiliate’s relative attractiveness as a
patent location, in comparison to other firms within the same multinational group.
We thus construct a tax variable which calculates the tax rate difference between the
considered affiliate and other firms within the MNE. This variable is also expected to
capture profit shifting incentives since locating a patent in a country with a low-tax
rate and then selling the right to use this patent from there to high-tax affiliates in the
same group, opens up profit shifting opportunities between the high-tax locations and
the patent-holding subsidiary in the low-tax economy.6
Third, if royalty income is paid across a national border, the country of the royalty
paying party usually charges a royalty withholding tax on the income stream. To avoid
international double taxation, royalty receiving countries apply a tax credit for the
withholding taxes already paid before assessing the income stream at their corporate
tax rate. Consequently, the effective tax burden on international royalty payments is
determined by the size of the corporate income tax at the royalty-receiving country in
relation to the size of the withholding tax imposed by the royalty-paying country. If the
receiving country’s corporate tax rate is higher than the withholding tax paid at source,
a full credit will be provided for the tax already paid, meaning that the royalty income
is effectively taxed at the statutory tax rate of the royalty-receiving economy. In this
5Note in this context that some countries have introduced special low tax rates on royalty income
in their legislation. Since the introduction of these special rates are very recent, they fall outside of
our sample period of 1995-2003, and we do not take them into consideration in our empirical analysis.
Precisely, special low royalty income tax rates were recently introduced in Hungary, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands. Ireland in turn has exempted royalty income from taxation since 1973. However, until
2008 this exemption was granted only if the MNE equally undertook the R&D in Ireland. As patent
relocation schemes often imply a geographical separation of R&D and patent ownership, we use the
Irish standard corporate tax rate in our empirical analysis but in robustness checks reran the analysis
using a zero income tax rate for Ireland which turns out to leave the qualitative and quantitative
results unaffected.
6Note that locating the patent at one of the high-tax affiliates is less attractive as it implies that
the MNE gains only one profit shifting link between the high-tax intangibles-owner and a low-tax
country while other operating affiliates in high-tax economies remain without a shifting link (see also
Dischinger and Riedel, 2008).
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scenario the withholding tax rate does not affect the corporate after-tax income and
consequently the patent location decision. However, if the royalty-receiving country’s
corporate tax rate falls short from the withholding tax paid at source, the tax rebate
is restricted to the corporate income tax due. In this scenario, the royalty income is
effectively taxed at the withholding rate which generates incentives for the MNE to
locate patents in countries that have favorable bilateral tax treaties and thus ensure
low withholding taxes on the royalty income stream.
Last, our analysis accounts for so-called ‘Controlled Foreign Company’ (CFC) rules
which intend to prevent companies from avoiding taxes in their residence country by
diverting income to subsidiaries in low tax jurisdictions. CFC rules operate by imposing
an immediate tax charge at the level of the parent company on income earned in a
foreign subsidiary if a set of criteria is fulfilled. The criteria vary across countries but
in essence include an ownership threshold (e.g. the parent must hold more than 10% of
the equity in the subsidiary), a tax threshold (e.g. the foreign tax paid on the subsidiary
income must be less than 60% of the tax that would have been paid had the income
been generated at the parent’s location), and a threshold which specifies that a certain
proportion of the subsidiary’s income must arise from ‘passive’ or ‘tainted’ sources (e.g.
a fraction greater than 5%). In most national CFC laws, royalties are considered to
be passive income. If the CFC criteria for a given subsidiary are satisfied, the passive
income of that subsidiary effectively becomes taxed at the corporate rate at the parent
location, even if the income is not repatriated. We thus hypothesize that subsidiaries
that are subject to CFC rules are less likely to own patents.
Summarizing, this section suggests that MNEs have an incentive to locate their
corporate patents at affiliates which observe a low corporate tax burden relative to
other group members and do not face binding CFC legislations. From a practical point
of view, MNEs can exploit different organizational structures to achieve a (re)location of
patents to low-tax economies. First, they may obviously shift whole R&D units to low-
tax affiliates. As this, however, may involve considerable costs, practitionners claim that
a more often applied structure is to engage in subcontracting agreements in which the
R&D head office is located in a low-tax country and subcontracts research to operating
R&D units at other affiliates. The latter earn a fixed margin on their costs while the
head office bears the project risk, receives the associated patent rights and earns all
residual profits. Apart from subcontracting agreements, affiliates may moreover also
engage in cost-sharing arrangements in which several affiliates share the costs and
benefits of developing a (later patented) technology. If appropriately structured, these
cost sharing agreements allow MNEs to assign an overproportional amount of profits
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to low-tax affiliates. In the following, we will empirically test whether and to what
extent MNEs engage in these relocation activities by exploiting information on patent
applications of multinational affiliates.7 The next section will describe our dataset and
the construction of the tax variables used in our empirical analysis.
3 Data description
Our analysis is based on a unique dataset which links patent applications to firm-level
accounting and ownership data. The dataset has been generated by a match of patent
applications from the European Patent Office (EPO) to the European firm data base
AMADEUS, in a research effort undertaken by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (see
Abramovsky et al. (2008) for details).
The patents data comes from the EPO’s Worldwide Patent Statistical Database
(PATSTAT) which contains information on all patent applications to the EPO dating
back to 1978, including (among others) information on the name of the patent applicant
and the application date. The data version used in this paper is October 2007 and
comprises up to 100,000 patent applications per year. Firms seeking patent protection in
a number of European states may file an application directly at the EPO and designate
the relevant national offices (among those covered by the EPO) in which protection is
sought.8 Filing a patent with the EPO firstly enables a firm to make a single application
which is cheaper than filing separately in each national office and secondly allows it to
delay the decision over which national states to further the application in. Thus, it is
especially attractive to file the valuable patents with the EPO which a firm intends to
exploit in several European markets.
The data on patent applications is merged to European company accounts informa-
tion collected by Bureau van Dijk in the AMADEUS database.9 The company data
is available in panel format for the years 1995 to 2003 and thus, we also restrict the
7As we only observe information on patent applications, our data does not capture any patent
relocation after the application process. However, as outright sales of intangible assets are scarce in
practice, we consider our analysis to reflect the most important strategies to transfer patent ownership
to low-tax economies (see e.g. OECD, 2009).
8The EPO is not a body of the European Union and as a result the states which form part of the
European Patent Convention (the legal basis for the EPO) are distinct from those in the European
Union. See: http://www.epo.org/about-us/epo/member-states.html.
9Precisely, the IFS applies a standard name matching procedure to link the two data sets. For
detailed information see Abramovsky et al. (2008).
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merged data to the years 1995 to 2003.10 One advantage of the AMADEUS data is that
it covers a large number of firms across many countries and includes both, accounting
and ownership information. We capture subsidiaries that are ultimately owned by a
parent firm whereas ultimate ownership implies that the parent is an independent com-
pany (i.e. no single firm owns more than 24.99% of the shares) and holds a recorded
share of over 24.99% in the subsidiary (whereas the ownership shares are commonly
considerably higher, being close to a 100% in the majority of cases). The parent is the
highest firm in the ownership chain for which the above conditions hold. Note, however,
that one drawback of the AMADEUS database is that it records ownership at a single
point in time which is the year 2004 in our sample. In line with previous papers, we are
however not too concerned about this issue as misclassifications of parent-subsidiary
connections introduce noise into our analysis (where group information is exploited in
the regressions) and tend to bias our results against zero. Thus, the associated coeffi-
cient estimates have to be interpreted as a lower bound to the true effect.
The matched data comprises patent applications filed by firms from 18 European
countries: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
Switzerland, United Kingdom. The match rates for the data sets are satisfactory with
a proportion of 50% to 70% of patent owning firms in PATSTAT being matched to
AMADEUS in the large European countries. For some East-European countries match
rates can be smaller, as low as 25%, which is driven by a small coverage of AMADEUS
in those countries and a low matching effort of the IFS (see Abramovsky et al. 2008).
In terms of the number of patents matched per country, success rates are even higher
ranging between 80% and 99% which reflects that large companies owning a lot of
patents are well represented in AMADEUS.
Since our analysis centers around tax effects on the location of patents within MNEs,
we restrict the dataset to subsidiaries belonging to multinational groups. For a multi-
national subsidiary to be included in the data, it had to apply for a patent at least
once within our sample period and thus we restrict our analysis to firms which in gen-
eral qualify as patent holding subsidiaries. As the coverage of multinational firms in
AMADEUS is much better than the coverage of national firms, we are confident that
our dataset includes all important patent holding subsidiaries in Europe.
10As the PATSTAT data on patent applications is available for a longer time span, we nevertheless
reran our regressions without firm data controls for the whole time period covered in PATSTAT and
found comparable results to the ones reported in this paper.
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From this data, we determine the annual number of patent applications filed by a
corporate subsidiary and hence, the observational unit in our analysis is the multina-
tional affiliate per year. In total, our sample comprises 85, 330 observations for 11, 828
multinational subsidiaries. Country statistics for our sample are presented in Table 1.
The pattern of multinational subsidiaries and their parent countries broadly resembles
the pattern of multinational firms in Europe with the largest fraction of firms in France,
Germany and the United Kingdom.11 The very high number of UK subsidiaries partly
reflects a high matching effort of the IFS for that country. Switzerland and Netherlands
host a high number of patent owning subsidiaries, which may partly reflect the favor-
able tax treatment of royalty income in these countries. Note, moreover, that while our
subsidiary sample is restricted to European countries, parent firms (i.e. global ultimate
owners) may equally be located in a country outside the EU. As depicted in Table 1,
most of the non-European parent firms reside in the US and Japan.
Moreover, basic descriptive statistics for the data are presented in Table 2. On av-
erage, a subsidiary applies for 0.7 patents per year whereas the patent count varies
between a minimum of 0 patents and a maximum of 20 patents.12 Moreover, we con-
struct a binary variable which takes on the value 1 if the subsidiary applies for a positive
number of patents in a considered year and 0 otherwise; 28% of the subsidiary-year
combinations exhibit a positive number of patent applications.
To determine the effect of corporate tax legislation on the multinational choice of
patent location, we add information on the corporate tax systems of each country. First,
we add the statutory tax rate applicable in a subsidiary’s host country (obtained from
EUROSTAT). Second, we capture the relative attractiveness of an affiliate as a patent
location by calculating the tax measure tdit, which captures the tax rate difference
between subsidiary i’s statutory tax rate at time t and the statutory tax rate of all
other affiliates within the corporate group, including the parent firm. To do so, we have
to restrict our analysis to subsidiaries for which AMADEUS contains information on
11Note that Table 1 depicts the subsidiary and parent countries for the affiliates in our sample and
thus, the sum of both columns adds up to the total number of subsidiaries in our sample.
12To avoid that our results are driven by outliers, we deleted a set of companies with very large
patent application numbers from our analysis which is however not decisive for our qualitative results.
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the ownership structure of the whole multinational group.13 Formally, tdit is defined as
tdit =
∑
j
1
N
(tit − tjt) , i 6= j (1)
whereas j indicates all foreign affiliates in the same multinational group as subsidiary
i and N depicts the overall number of foreign affiliates. Note, that equation (1) implies
the calculation of an unweighted average which we consider to be appropriate in our
context as size information (e.g. on the affiliates’ total asset investment) is available
only for a subset of multinational subsidiaries and we would thus loose a non-negligible
number of subsidiaries when calculating a size-weighted average. However, in robustness
checks we experimented with a size-weighted average tax difference measures and did
not find our qualitative results to change. Moreover, in the calculation of tdi we account
for foreign affiliates which are either the subsidiary’s parent firm or owned by the group
with 100% of the ownership rights only. The rationale behind this is that we consider
partially owned subsidiaries to be less likely to hold corporate patents and also to be less
likely to be integrated in the MNE’s profit shifting activities (see e.g. Weichenrieder,
2009). Nevertheless, again we ran robustness checks which additionally account for
partially owned subsidiaries in the calculation of tdit and did not find our empirical
results to be sensitive with respect to this modification.
As shown in Table 2a, both the statutory tax rate as well as the constructed tax
difference measure tdit exhibit considerable variation across our sample observations.
The average statutory tax rate is 37.7% and it varies between 10% and 59% for the firms
in our sample. The average tax difference is 0% and exhibits a wide spread between
-30.5% and 37.5%.
Third, we add information on withholding rates which apply on royalties payments
to a subsidiary in our sample. Royalty withholding rates are specified in bilateral tax
treaties. If a bilateral tax treaty does not exist, countries usually impose a unilateral rate
which holds for royalty payments to all non-treaty countries. Since the unilateral rates
are generally higher than the treaty rates, countries with a favorable treaty network are
expected to be attractive patent locations. We retrieve information on the unilateral
royalty withholding rates as well as information on treaty withholding rates from the
Ernest & Young corporate tax guides 1995-2003.
13Precisely, this implies that information on the subsidiary’s ultimate owner must be available with
AMADEUS as well as a full list of the affiliates owned by this ultimate owner. Note that, although
AMADEUS does provide accounting information for affiliates within Europe only, the ownership
information is available on a worldwide basis, i.e. includes subsidiaries outside European borders.
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This information allows us to calculate a tax measure teit which captures the ef-
fective tax burden on royalty income earned by patents held at a given multinational
subsidiary. As described in Section 2, this effective tax rate on royalty income is cal-
culated as the maximum of the statutory tax rate applicable at the income-receiving
subsidiary and the withholding tax rate applicable on the royalty income stream. To
calculate this effective tax burden in our data set, we have to make an assumption about
the nature of the royalty streams earned by a patent-holding subsidiary in our sample.
As patents are widely acknowledged to be common goods within a multinational firm
which are employed as input factor by several operating affiliates (see Markusen, 1995),
we will assume that a patent-holding subsidiary receives royalty income from all other
affiliates within its multinational group, including the parent.14 Therefore, to calculate
the effective tax rate for a considered subsidiary, we determine the maximum of the
subsidiary’s statutory tax rate and the withholding tax rate applicable if royalties are
paid from a foreign affiliate to the considered subsidiary and take the unweighted av-
erage of these measures. Again, we account for wholly owned affiliates only. Formally,
this is captured by
teit =
∑
j
1
N
max(tit, whti,j,t), i 6= j (2)
whereas whti,j,t depicts the withholding tax rate applicable on royalty income paid by
the foreign affiliate j to the considered subsidiary i. Again, we determine an unweighted
average of the royalty withholding rates and restrict the calculation in (2) to foreign
affiliates which are either the considered subsidiary’s parent or are wholly owned by
the multinational group. In robustness checks, we relaxed these assumptions and did
not find our qualitative results to be affected.
Table 2b exhibits the withholding tax rates on royalty income applicable in 2003
between EU countries, the US and Japan. The table indicates that withholding tax
rates are usually low, being zero in many cases. High rates mostly apply for roy-
alty payments involving Eastern and Southern European member states, the US and
Japan.15 Moreover, the multinational groups in our sample comprise several non-EU
subsidiaries whose host countries do not have tax treaties with the European economies
in our sample and thus charge unilateral withholding rates which are well above 20%.
14Thus, we implicitly assume that patent(s) held at the considered subsidiary are used by all other
affiliates within the group and that royalties are paid for the use of this patent.
15Note, that after our sample period in 2004 the EU Interest and Royalty Directive took effect which
abolished withholding tax rates between countries in the European Union.
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As presented in the sample statistics in Table 2a, the average withholding tax rates
charged on royalty streams from foreign group members to our sample subsidiaries
vary between 0% and 30%, but the average rate is only 1.1%. Thus it is not surprising
to find that the calculation of the effective tax rate teit is largely dominated by the
statutory tax measure as the withholding tax is usually lower than the host country’s
corporate tax. The average rate is 35.5% and varies between a minimum of 10% and a
maximum rate of 59%.16
Last, we construct a CFC dummy variable which indicates whether CFC legislations
are binding for a subsidiary in a given year. The information on CFC legislations is
collected from Sandler (1998), Lang et al. (2004) and the International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation (IBFD).17 As described in the previous section, for CFC rules to be
binding, they have to be implemented in the subsidiary’s parent country and three
additional criteria have to be fulfilled: First, the parent firm has to hold a sufficiently
large ownership share in the subsidiary. Second, the income derived in the subsidiary
has to be mainly passive in nature. Third, the subsidiary’s host economy has to be
classified as a tax haven by its parent country.
Since the subsidiaries in our sample are ultimately owned by their parent firms and
the ownership thresholds in CFC legislations are usually low (at 10%), the ownership
criterion is fulfilled for all affiliates in our sample. Moreover, royalty income earned on
patents is one potential source of passive income in a subsidiary since it often does
not relate to other active parts of the business, and hence we equally assume the
passive income criterion is fulfilled. Consequently, the construction of our CFC dummy
variable will focus on the tax haven criteria which are summarized in Table 2c for the
most important parent countries in our sample. As depicted in the table, the tax haven
criteria are fulfilled if the subsidiary’s host country is on a black list at the parent
location or exhibits a corporate tax rate that falls short of a defined threshold. Since
many of the subsidiaries in our sample are located in European high-tax countries,
16Note that the average effective tax rate calculated for our sample is slightly smaller than the
average statutory tax rate. Theoretically, the statutory tax rate measure should be a lower bound
for the effective tax rate measure which is the maximum of the statutory and the withholding rate
on royalty income. However, the effective tax rate measure can only be calculated for the subset of
our sample affiliates for which ownership information on the multinational group is available, which
overproportionally tends to be the case for sample subsidiaries with a low corporate tax rate and
henceforth also a low effective tax rate measure.
17We collected information on CFC legislations for all major parent countries in our sample (i.e.
EU25, the US, Canada, Japan and Korea). As a small number of firms in our sample observe parents
located in other countries, the CFC legislation is missing for a small fraction of the observations.
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CFC rules do not apply in their context. Thus, it is not surprising that the fraction
of observations in our sample for which CFC rules are binding is only 6.4%. As shown
in Table 2d, CFC legislations are most likely to apply if the parent firm resides in the
US, Canada and Germany. In turn, the subsidiaries for which CFC rules are likely
to be binding tend to be located in countries with low tax rates, such as Ireland and
Switzerland (in which 43% and 20% of the sample subsidiaries face binding CFC rules,
see the last column of Table 2c).
Note, however, that our constructed measure for a binding CFC rule is only a proxy.
One issue may for example be that there is a considerable number of US owned Euro-
pean subsidiaries in our sample which we classify as being subject to CFC treatment.
But in practice US multinationals may opt out of CFC treatment under so-called “check
the box” rules. Since we cannot track which of the European subsidiaries of US parents
have been elected to “check the box” treatment, we assume they are all subject to the
usual CFC treatment. As this might not hold for all cases, we introduce noise to our es-
timation which is expected to bias our coefficient estimates towards zero. Henceforth, if
we find significant effects of CFC rules on patent ownership, they should be interpreted
as the lower bound to the true impact.
Moreover, Table 2a reports summary statistics for the size of the firms included in our
sample. The size measures vary strongly across the companies in our sample with an
average employment number of 1, 408 but a relatively large standard deviation from the
mean. The same applies for the fixed asset variable. Additionally, we add information
on time-varying country characteristics which we presume to influence the location of
corporate patents, precisely the number of scientific researchers per million of country
inhabitants and the gross domestic product (GDP) (both obtained from the World
Development Indicator database). The average subsidiary in our sample is located in
a country with a GDP of 1.4 trillions US dollars and 2, 918 scientific researchers per
million of country inhabitants.
4 Estimation Methodology
The aim of our analysis is to determine if and to what extent corporate taxation impacts
on the location of patents within a multinational group. The analysis focuses on the
tax determinants of the number of patent applications by a multinational subsidiary i
in year t. Precisely, we estimate a model of the following form
yit = β1Tit + β2Xit + θi + ρt + i,t (3)
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whereas yi,t depicts subsidiary i’s number of patent applications at time t which is
regressed on a vector of corporate tax parameters Ti,t comprising the variables con-
structed in the previous Sections 2 and 3: the host country’s statutory tax rate tit, the
tax rate difference between the considered affiliate and other group members tdit, an
effective tax rate on royalty income which takes into account the corporate tax rate
and the withholding rates on royalty income teit and last, a dummy variable CFCit
which indicates whether CFC rules apply. We expect all these variables to decrease
the number of patents held by a subsidiary and hence the estimated coefficients on the
regressors are expected to be negative (β1 < 0).
Moreover, we include a set of control variables into our analysis which is depicted by
the vector Xit. First, we account for affiliate size to ensure that the coefficient estimates
for β1 do not only reflect the well-known negative effect of corporate taxes on firm size.
Precisely, we include the number of employees as a size control whereas sensitivity
checks show that the results are robust against the use of other size variables like fixed
asset investment. Moreover, we account for the country’s attractiveness as an R&D
location and its market size by including control variables for the number of scientific
researchers per inhabitants and the country’s GDP.18 However, the attractiveness of a
subsidiary as a patent location is also likely to be determined by affiliate specific factors
which are unobservable to the econometrician. This suggests to include a set of affiliate
fixed effects θi to capture time-constant firm differences which is also confirmed by a
Hausman test. Last, we include a full set of year fixed effects ρt to control for shocks
over time that are common to all subsidiaries and (in robustness checks) add a full set
of 2-digit industry-year dummies to account for industry-specific shocks over time.
In the first set of regressions, we estimate equation (3) in a simple OLS framework
with firm fixed effects. The OLS approach however does not account for the fact that
the patent variable is restricted to positive values. We thus in a second step reestimate
equation (3) in models which account for censored data.19 In the following, we will
present the results of a random effects tobit framework. Note that the estimation of
a fixed effect tobit model is not feasible as a sufficient statistic that allows the fixed
effect to be conditioned out of the likelihood does not exist. We however allow for
a correlation between the subsidiary specific effects and the explanatory variables in
18In robustness checks, we moreover experimented with including additional country characteristics
and did not find our results to be affected (see Section 5).
19Note that the number of patent counts may become negative if multinationals, for example,
withdraw patent applications or file a technology developed at a considered subsidiary with another
affiliate. As these cases are reported as zero counts, our data may be considered as censored.
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the random effects specifications following Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984)
by explicitly modelling this correlation and assuming a particular parameterization of
the firm specific effect as a function of the explanatory variables. Precisely, we adapt
an often made choice in this context and model the affiliate fixed effect as a linear
combination of the explanatory variables’ averages over time.
Nevertheless, our most preferred model is a negative binomial framework as it does
consider the count nature of our data and the skewed distribution in the number of
patent counts. The negative binomial specifications are thereby chosen since a likelihood
ratio test indicates overdispersion of our data and suggests that the model cannot be
collapsed to a poisson specification (although poisson estimations derive qualitatively
comparable results). Precisely, we follow Hausman et al. (1984) and estimate a negative
binomial regression model which accounts for firm specific effects.
5 Results
Our results are presented in Tables 3 to 6. All regressions account for subsidiary and
year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which control for clustering
at the firm level are depicted in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
Table 3 presents regressions of the number of patent applications on the host coun-
try’s corporate tax rate. Specifications (1) to (3) depict OLS estimates with subsidiary
fixed effects. In line with the intuition described in Section 2, we find that the corporate
tax rate exerts a significantly negative impact on the subsidiaries’ number of patent
applications. This effect turns out to be robust against the inclusion of time-varying
country controls in Specification (2) and a size control in Specification (3). Evaluated
at the sample mean, Specification (3) suggests that an increase in the corporate tax
rate by 1 percentage point reduces the number of patent applications by 2.8%.
Specifications (4) to (6) moreover account for the restriction of the patent variable to
positive values and reestimate the link between corporate taxes and patent applications
in a random effects tobit model which includes time-averages of the regressors to control
for time-invariant subsidiary characteristics. The results confirm our previous findings
and indicate a negative effect of corporate taxes on the number of patent applications
which is robust against the inclusion of time-varying country characteristics and a size
control in Specifications (5) and (6). The OLS effect is also quantitatively confirmed
as Specification (6) suggests that an increase in the corporate tax rate by 1 percentage
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point reduces the number of patent applications by 2.9%.20
However, as mentioned in the previous section, our most preferred specification is
a negative binomial model which controls for time-constant subsidiary characteristics
as this acknowledges the count nature of our data and the skewness in the patent
count distribution. The negative binomial framework is chosen as a likelihood ratio
test indicates overdispersion of the data and rejects the estimation of a poisson model
(the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic for the baseline specification in Column (7) is
799.65; if control variables are included in the specifications, the chi-square statistic
increases further). The results are presented in Specifications (7) to (9) and confirm our
previous findings as the corporate tax rate exerts a significant and negative impact on
the number of patent applications. Interpreting the coefficient estimates quantitatively
in this fixed effects framework is not straight forward (as the common assumption of a
zero fixed effect implies an implausible expected patent count of zero in this model). We
thus reestimate the specifications in a random effects negative binomial specification
which models fixed effects by time-averages of the regressors (whereas the results are
not reported in the paper but available from the authors upon request). Evaluated at
a random effect of zero (which is noncritical in the random-effect framework, see e.g.
Winkelmann, 2008), this model derives comparable quantitative results to the ones
reported in the OLS and tobit specifications.
The number of patent applications might, however, not only be dependent on the
statutory tax rate applicable in a country but may also be determined by alternative
location options within the multinational group. To account for that, we constructed an
alternative tax measure which captures the average difference between a subsidiary’s
statutory tax rate and the statutory tax rate at other group locations as described in
Section 3. Since the construction of the tax difference measure requires information on
the ownership structure of the multinational group which is available for a subset of
firms in our sample only, the sample size drops compared to our baseline estimations.
The results are presented in Table 4 and suggest a negative impact of the corporate tax
rate differential on the number of patent applications which is robust against different
model specifications and the inclusion of size and time-varying country-controls. Quan-
titatively, the findings largely resemble the results for the corporate tax rate measure
20 Note that the coefficient estimates in the random effects tobit model (presented in Specifications
(4) to (6)) have no direct quantitative interpretation. To quantitatively interpret the results, we assume
the random effect to be zero and calculate the marginal effect for the expected value of the patent
application variable conditional on being uncensored. For the specification in Column (6), we derive a
marginal effect of −2.01. Evaluated at the sample mean, this translates into a semi-elasticity of −2.9.
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presented in the previous table. The tobit specification in Column (6) suggests that an
increase in the corporate tax rate differential by 1 percentage point reduces the number
of patent applications by 2.3% (see also footnote 20).
So far, our analysis has only accounted for effects of statutory corporate tax rate
measures. However, as explained in the previous sections, the location of patents within
a multinational firm may equally be determined by royalty withholding taxes which
motivates the construction of an effective tax measure that takes both, the statutory
and the withholding tax rate, into account. Since the calculation of this tax measure
requires information on the MNE’s ownership structure (see Section 3), the sample
size again falls short of the baseline estimations. The results are presented in Table
5. Specifications (1) to (9) indicate that the constructed effective tax measure exerts
a significantly negative effect on the number of patent applications which prevails in
different model frameworks and is robust against the inclusion of size and country
controls. In quantitative terms, the results are comparable to our baseline estimations.
In Column (10), we moreover determine the effect of the statutory tax rate and the
withholding tax rate separately from each other in the negative binomial framework.
While the statutory tax rate as in previous specifications has a strong and negative
impact on the number of patent applications, the withholding tax rate on royalty
income does not exert a statistically significant effect. This reflects that withholding
tax rates are usually smaller than the corporate income tax due on the royalty income
stream which triggers a full rebate for the withholding taxes paid. Taking this into
account, it is not surprising that withholding taxes do not in general exert a significant
effect on the patent location decision.
Apart from that, we assess whether a binding CFC regulation affects the number
of patent applications. We thus reestimate the baseline specifications in Table 3 and
include a dummy variable which indicates whether the patent owning subsidiary is likely
to be subject to CFC treatment in the parent country (see Section 3 on the construction
of the variable). The results are presented in Table 6. The OLS specifications depicted
in Columns (1) to (3) suggest that the corporate tax rate exerts a negative effect on
the number of patent applications while the coefficient estimate for the CFC legislation
dummy, however, does not gain statistical significance. This is confirmed by estimations
of a random effects tobit model presented in Columns (4) to (6).
Nevertheless, as laid out in the previous section, our most preferred estimation model
is a negative binomial framework which accounts for subsidiary fixed effects. The results
of these specifications are presented in Columns (7) to (9). Interestingly, the count
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data model in line with our hypothesis suggests that a binding CFC rule reduces
the number of patents located at a subsidiary (see Column (7)) whereas this effect is
also robust against the inclusion of control variables for subsidiary size and country
characteristics (see Columns (8) and (9)). Thus, taking into account the count nature
and overdispersion of our data, we find evidence that binding CFC legislations are
effective in reducing the number of patent applications (and the associated, potentially
passive, income streams).
Finally, we ran a set of robustness checks. First, we reestimated all our specifications
controlling for a full set of 2-digit industry-year effects to absorb industry shocks over
time and find comparable results to the ones reported in this paper. Moreover, we ex-
perimented with different variables to control for affiliate size (e.g. subsidiary assets)
and additional country controls (e.g. a corruption index and the national unemploy-
ment rate) which leaves the results unchanged. Last, we accounted for the fact that
a large fraction of subsidiary-year combinations report zero patent applications and
additionally estimated a binary logit model which controls for subsidiary fixed effects.
These specifications derive qualitatively comparable results which are reported in an
earlier working paper version of this paper (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2009).
6 Conclusion and Discussion
Anecdotal evidence suggests that patents and other intangible assets play a decisive
role in profit shifting strategies of multinational enterprises. Several firms are known
to hold their patents and trademarks in tax-haven countries like Ireland and Switzer-
land, famous examples are Vodafone, Pfizer and Microsoft. Although tax authorities in
various countries have raised increasing concerns about these intangibles relocations,
studies which tests for the link between corporate taxes and intangible assets in a
systematic empirical framework are scarce.
This paper exploits a new and unique data set which links company accounting
data to information on patent applications provided by the European Patent Office in
order to investigate whether and to what extent corporate taxation affects the patent
location within multinational groups. Our results suggest that the corporate tax rate
exerts a strong negative impact on a subsidiary’s number of patent applications. The
effect appears across a range of model specifications and is robust against controlling
for affiliate size, firm fixed effects and time-varying country characteristics. Similar
findings are reported if we account for the relative attractiveness of a subsidiary’s
19
tax scheme by using the tax rate differential to other group members as explanatory
variable. Moreover, the estimated effects prevail if we additionally account for the role
of withholding taxes on royalty payments.
Thus, our findings indeed suggest that MNEs tend to distort the location of their
corporate patents in favor of low-tax affiliates. As patented technologies are considered
to be drivers of future profits and a major souce of transfer pricing opportunities within
multinational groups, their relocations are likely to shift relevant volumes of profit to
low-tax economies. Consequently, governments have an incentive to compete for these
mobile profits by reducing their corporate tax rates in order to attract multinational
patents to their jurisdiction. Recent tax policy changes in some countries suggest that
this is already taking place as Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg have
recently introduced special low tax rates on royalty income from patents.
This in turn puts pressure on high-tax economies with large R&D activities to restrict
the mitigation of patents and other intangible assets from their borders. One mean
to limit this outflow is to introduce or tighten CFC legislations which make foreign
royalty income taxable at the parent location. Examples of countries which recently
introduced CFC rules are Spain and Italy. Moreover, our empirical results suggest that
CFC legislations are indeed effective in restricting patent relocations as binding CFC
clauses are reported to exert a negative impact on the number of patent applications.
Furthermore, several countries currently consider to restrict intangibles relocations via
the introduction of a second anti-avoidance instrument. In 2008, Germany as the first
economy implemented a new legislation which aims to tax part of the future income
generated from patents and other (intangible) assets developed in Germany even after
their relocation to a foreign country (see OECD (2009) for details). Practitionners
suggest that other countries might implement similar legislations soon. In the light of
our results, these policy moves to limit the (re)location of patents and other intangible
assets to low-tax economies are highly welcome as they help to close an important profit
shifting channel and therefore to reduce international tax competition behaviour.
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Appendix: Tables
Table 1: Country Statistics
Country Subsidiary Location Parent Location
Belgium 266 356
Czech Republic 8 1
Denmark 588 579
Finland 162 180
France 1,527 1,320
Germany 2,984 2,317
Great Britain 2,812 1,991
Greece 2 4
Ireland 87 56
Italy 515 452
Luxembourg 29 43
Netherlands 944 1,080
Norway 222 209
Poland 7 1
Portugal 11 12
Spain 324 256
Sweden 838 881
Switzerland 502 546
Austria – 89
Canada – 49
Japan – 136
United States – 1,057
Others – 213
Sum 11,828 11,828
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Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median Min. Max.
Number of Patents 85,330 .706 0 0 20
Dummy for Patent OwnershipN 85,330 .281 0 0 1
Statutory Tax Rate 85,330 .377 .35 0.1 .59
Tax Rate Difference 28,939 .009 0 -.305 .375
Effective Tax Rate 27,074 .355 .31 .1 .59
Withholding Tax Rate 27,074 0.011 0 0 .3
Binding CFC Legislation 85,192 .064 0 0 1
Number of Researchers 85,330 2,915.985 2,873.071 1,014.0 7,998.24
GDPF 85,330 1,347.569 705.441 20.329 2,446.885
Number of Employees 14,322 1,066.496 277 1 92,916
Fixed Assets 13,995 174,773.6 8,924 0 7.33e+07
Notes:
N Takes on the value 1 if a subsidiary observes a positive number of patents applications in a considered year, 0
otherwise.
 Per million people
F In billion of US dollars.
 In thousands of US dollars.
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Table 2c: CFC Legislation in 2003
Country CFC Dummy Tax Haven Definition
Belgium 0 –
Czech Republic 0 –
Denmark 1 Effective tax < 75% of Danish Tax
Finland 1 Effective tax < 60% of Finish Tax
France 1 Effective tax < 66% of French Tax
Germany 1 Effective tax < 25%
Great Britain 1 Effective tax < 75% of British Tax
Greece 0 –
Ireland 0 –
Italy 1 Black List
Luxembourg 0 –
Netherlands 0 –
Norway 1 Effective tax < 66% of Norwegian Tax
Poland 0 –
Portugal 1 Effective tax < 60% of Portugese Tax
Spain 1 Effective tax < 75% of Spanish Tax
Sweden 1 Effective tax < 55% of Swedish Tax
Switzerland 0 –
Austria 0 –
Canada 1 Always Binding
Japan 1 Effective tax < 25%
United States 1 Effective tax < 75% of US Tax
Notes:
CFC Dummy takes on the value 1 if the parent country has a CFC legislation and the value 0 otherwise. In the case of
Norway, the 66% rule does not apply if a bilateral tax treaty exists between Norway and the country of the controlled
subsidiary, unless the majority of the income in that subsidiary is passive. We use our data on royalty withholding rates
to determine whether a bilateral tax treaty exists. In the case of Italy the black list of tax havens is quite long to be
listed here, but it is based on and is very similar to the OECD tax haven list.
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Table 2d: Binding CFC Legislation
Country Parent-Year Subsidiary-Year (in #) Subsidiary-Year (in %)
Belgium 0 8 0.34
Czech Republic 0 0 0
Denmark 12 138 3.91
Finland 16 36 3.20
France 24 326 2.69
Germany 139 48 0.20
Great Britain 56 3,725 16.61
Greece 0 0 0
Ireland 0 296 42.53
Italy 5 24 0.59
Luxembourg 0 2 3.51
Netherlands 0 335 4.45
Norway 0 34 3.83
Poland 0 5 8.93
Portugal 0 0 0
Spain 2 134 5.17
Sweden 16 154 4.62
Switzerland 0 204 20.46
Austria 0 – –
Canada 379 – –
Japan 0 – –
United States 4,832 – –
Sum 5,469 5,469 –
Notes:
The parent-year column depicts the parent countries for the subsidiary-year observations which face binding CFC rules.
The subsidiary-year column (in #) presents the country distribution for the subsidiary-year observations which face
binding CFC rules. Analogously, the last column (subsidiary-year (in %)) indicates the percentage of the subsidiary-year
observations per country which face binding CFC rules.
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Table 3: Effects of the Statutory Tax Rate
Panel 1995–2003
Model FE OLS RE Tobit FE Negative Binomial Model
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Statutory Tax Rate -1.751∗∗∗ -1.130∗∗∗ -2.025∗ -4.654∗∗∗ -3.066∗∗∗ -4.885∗∗∗ -.677∗∗∗ -.939∗∗∗ -1.241∗∗∗
(.194) (.201) (1.100) (.447) (.567) (1.710) (.195) (.221) (.402)
Log # Researchers .299∗∗∗ .020 1.651∗∗∗ .822 .193∗∗∗ .184
(.098) (.448) (.374) (.710) (.097) (.210)
Log GDP -.752∗∗∗ -1.776∗∗∗ -2.187∗∗∗ -1.681∗∗∗ .100∗∗ .419∗∗∗
(.096) (.563) (.347) (.668) (.041) (.092)
Log Employees .194∗∗∗ .437∗∗∗ .094∗∗∗
(.048) (.096) (.026)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Time Avg. Expl. V.
√ √ √
# Observations 85,330 85,330 12,033 85,330 85,330 12,033 79,768 79,768 9,841
# Firms 11,828 11,828 3,888 11,828 11,828 3,888 10,738 10,738 2,315
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates signif-
icance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries per sample year. All
regressions include a full set of firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is the number of patents located at
a multinational subsidiary. Statutory Tax Rate depicts the statutory tax rate applicable in the subsidiaries’
host country. Log # Researchers stands for the natural logarithm of the number of scientific researchers in a
country, Log GDP is the natural logarithm of the gross domestic product. Log Employees depicts the natural
logarithm (Log) of the firm’s number of employees. FE and RE indicate fixed effect and random effect specifi-
cations respectively. Time Avg. Expl. V. indicates that time averaged explanatory variables are included in the
estimation.
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Table 4: Effects of the Statutory Tax Rate Difference
Panel 1995–2003
Model FE OLS RE Tobit FE Negative Binomial Model
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tax Rate Difference -2.148∗∗∗ -1.164∗∗ -3.340∗ -4.821∗∗∗ -2.594∗ -4.455∗ -.784∗∗ -1.102∗∗∗ -1.939∗∗∗
(.553) (.564) (2.009) (1.443) (1.476) (2.458) (.337) (.355) (.762)
Log # Researchers .243 -.370 2.588∗∗∗ -.190 .367∗∗∗ -.205
(.228) (.965) (.853) (1.290) (.150) (.469)
Log GDP -1.139∗∗∗ -1.331 -3.185∗∗∗ -1.312 .115∗ .430∗∗∗
(.176) (.845) (.444) (1.048) (.064) (.117)
Log Employees .198∗∗∗ .441∗∗∗ .122∗∗∗
(.081) (.146) (.046)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Time Avg. Expl. V.
√ √ √
# Observations 28,939 28,939 4,464 28,939 28,939 4,464 26,606 26,606 3,631
# Firms 4,177 4,177 1,482 4,177 4,177 1,482 3,695 3,695 886
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates signif-
icance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries per sample year. All
regressions include a full set of firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is the number of patents located at
a multinational subsidiary. Tax Rate Difference depicts the unweighted average difference in the statutory tax
rates between the considered subsidiary and other group members. Log # Researchers stands for the natural
logarithm of the number of scientific researchers in a country, Log GDP is the natural logarithm of the gross
domestic product. Log Employees depicts the natural logarithm (Log) of the firm’s number of employees. FE
and RE indicate fixed effect and random effect specifications respectively. Time Avg. Expl. V. indicates that
time averaged explanatory variables are included in the estimation.
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Table 5: Effects of the Effective Tax Rate
Panel 1995–2003
Model FE OLS RE Tobit FE Negative Binomial Model
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Effective Tax Rate -2.445∗∗∗ -1.629∗∗∗ -5.479∗∗∗ -5.497∗∗∗ -4.412∗∗∗ -7.904∗∗∗ -.658∗∗ -1.138∗∗∗ -2.594∗∗∗
(.467) (.472) (2.222) (1.058) (1.068) (3.005) (.318) (.397) (.753)
Statutory Tax Rate -2.589∗∗∗
(.884)
Withholding Tax Rate -1.653
(8.039)
Log # Researchers .435∗ .367 3.092∗∗∗ .917 .412∗∗ -.098 -.123
(.244) (.939) (.687) (1.363) (.181) (.456) (.364)
Log GDP -.930∗∗∗ -.935 -1.951∗∗∗ -.763 .180∗∗∗ .561∗∗∗ .558∗∗∗
(.166) (.834) (.447) (1.176) (.056) (.135) (.116)
Log Employees .188∗∗∗ .418∗∗∗ .133∗∗∗ .133∗∗∗
(.080) (.142) (.045) (.043)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Time Avg. Expl. V.
√ √ √
# Observations 27,074 27,074 4,150 27,074 27,074 4,150 24,931 24,931 3,366 3,366
# Firms 3,896 3,896 1,392 3,896 3,896 1,392 3,456 3,456 828 828
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries per sample
year. All regressions include a full set of firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is the number of patents
located at a multinational subsidiary. Effective Tax Rate stands for the effective tax on a subsidiaries’
royalty income. Statutory Tax Rate and Withholding Tax Rate depict the statutory and withholding tax
rate applicable in the subsidiaries’ host country. Log # Researchers stands for the natural logarithm of
the number of scientific researchers in a country, Log GDP is the natural logarithm of the gross domestic
product. Log Employees depicts the natural logarithm (Log) of the firm’s number of employees. FE and
RE indicate fixed effect and random effect specifications respectively. Time Avg. Expl. V. indicates that
time averaged explanatory variables are included in the estimation.
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Table 6: Effects of CFC Legislations
Panel 1995–2003
Model FE OLS RE Tobit FE Negative Binomial Model
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Statutory Tax Rate -1.751∗∗∗ -1.131∗∗∗ -1.950∗ -4.799∗∗∗ -3.134∗∗∗ -4.824∗∗∗ -.764∗∗∗ -1.021∗∗∗ -1.296∗∗∗
(.194) (.201) (1.102) (.443) (.574) (1.369) (.206) (.168) (.426)
CFC Legislation .038 .004 .069 -.014 -.126 -.156 -.325∗∗∗ -.323∗∗∗ -.319∗
(.124) (.125) (.377) (.310) (.267) (.653) (.097) (.091) (.197)
Log # Researchers .299∗∗∗ -.005 1.710∗∗∗ .767 .199∗∗ .194
(.098) (.445) (.420) (.824) (.096) (.211)
Log GDP -.751∗∗∗ -1.749∗∗∗ -2.315∗∗∗ -1.668∗∗∗ .115∗ .424∗∗∗
(.097) (.565) (.347) (.624) (.064) (.102)
Log Employees .192∗∗∗ .431∗∗∗ .092∗∗∗
(.048) (.076) (.026)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Time Avg. Expl. V.
√ √ √
# Observations 85,192 85,192 11,990 85,192 85,192 11,990 79,642 79,642 9,802
# Firms 11,809 11,809 3,877 11,809 11,809 3,877 10,721 10,721 2,308
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates signif-
icance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries per sample year. All
regressions include a full set of firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is the number of patents located at a
multinational subsidiary. Statutory Tax Rate depicts the statutory tax rate applicable in the subsidiaries’ host
country. CFC Legislation is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the affiliate income is subject to
a binding CFC legislation in the parent country. Log # Researchers stands for the natural logarithm of the
number of scientific researchers in a country, Log GDP is the natural logarithm of the gross domestic product.
Log Employees depicts the natural logarithm (Log) of the firm’s number of employees. FE and RE indicate fixed
effect and random effect specifications respectively. Time Avg. Expl. V. indicates that time averaged explanatory
variables are included in the estimation.
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